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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff Appellee,

:

Case No. 20000773-CA

ANGELA RASMUSSEN,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

:

v.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appealfroma conviction for robbery, a second degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
I

Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, presiding. This Court has
jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the defendant fail to marshal all the evidence in support of the jury's verdict,
thus waiving her right to have her claim of insufficiency considered on appeal? "Failure to
marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his claim of insufficiency [of
evidence] considered on appeal." State v. Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1185, 1189 (citing State v.
Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990)).
2. Should this Court consider defendant's claim that the trial court erred in excluding
some of her testimony? '"[The reviewing court] will not set aside a verdict because of the

erroneous exclusion of evidence unless a proffer of evidence appears of record/" State v.
Telford, 940 P.2d 522, 526 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 499
(Utah 1986) and Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(2)).
3. Should the Court review defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
unsupported by an adequate record on appeal? "Where the record appears inadequate in any
fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of
a finding that counsel performed effectively." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,117, 12 P.3d
92 (noting "the general rule that record inadequacies result in an assumption of regularity on
appeal") (citing State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Utah 1997)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are
attached at Addendum A:
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1999);
Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure;
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Angela Rasmussen, was charged with robbery (R. 2-3). A jury convicted
defendant of the offense charged (R. 75). The trial court denied defendant's motion for arrest
of judgment (R. 126-27). The trial court sentenced defendant to a statutory one-to-fifteen
year term in the Utah State Prison. However, the court suspended the sentence, placing
2

defendant on probation on condition that she continue treatment with her psychotherapist and
participate in theft and/or cognitive restructuring counseling (R. 104-05). Defendant filed
a timely notice of appeal from her conviction (R. 107-08).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
At about 5:00 p.m. on January 15, 2000, defendant went to a Dessert Industries
("D.I.") thrift store in Sandy, Utah (R. 130:42, 55,132). Defendant noticed a wedding dress
in the "bid" section which abuts the front of the store (R. 130:41, 134-135). The bid area is
kept under lock for collectibles or antique items (R. 130:39-40). The area is posted with
signs, including a large yellow sign identifying the bid area and explaining the bidding
procedure and there is always at least one employee present to explain the procedures and
to operate the cash registers (R. 130:40). The smaller items are locked in the glass area (R.
130:40). The wedding dress was a larger item located in the bidding area but hung on a
hanger between the bidding area and the glass next to the outside of the building (R. 130:4041). Defendant admitted she was familiar with the bid section of the store and the bidding
procedure, and that she knew that bid items were not supposed to leave the bid area (R.
130:155).
Lindsay Waldron was also shopping at the D.I. on January 15 (R. 130:86). Ms.
Waldron was surprised to see defendant standing behind her in the cashier line holding the

1

The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v.
Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Utah App. 1995).
3

wedding dress from the bid area (R. 130:87). Having seen the wedding dress in the bid area
and being familiar with the bidding process, she knew no one should have been in possession
of the dress because the bidding date on the dress had not closed (R. 130:86-87). Ms.
Waldron commented to her husband, standing near her in line, that the woman behind them
had the wedding dress from the bid area in her hand (R. 130:88). Ms. Waldron spoke loud
enough so the defendant could overhear what she was saying to her husband (R. 130:99).
Ms. Waldron's husband looked back at defendant, who appeared startled (R. 130:88).
Defendant then left the line with the dress and walked towards the back of the store (R.
130:88, 100).
Ms. Waldron noticed defendant in the middle of the store periodically looking at
clothes on the racks and looking up at her and her husband (R. 130:88-89). Defendant still
had the dress in her hand, and Ms. Waldron did not see anything else in defendant's hands
(R. 130:89). When she reached the register, Ms. Waldron informed the cashier of what she
had seen (R. 130:89). In the company of the cashier, Ms. Waldron found defendant exiting
one of the dressing rooms, located by the store's exit, with a full duffle bag in her hand (R.
130:89-90, 101).
Mr. Wilcox, a D.I. employee, also saw defendant walking out of the dressing room
(R. 130:42,90). Ms. Waldron came running to him, grabbed his arm, and reported what she
had seen (R. 130:42, 101). He immediately directed three female employees to go into all
four dressing rooms to locate the dress and return it him if they found it (R. 130:43). They
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all returned empty-handed and said there was nothing to be found (R. 130:44). Based on his
conversation with Ms. Waldron and others, Mr. Wilcox was confident that defendant had
taken the dress from the store (R. 130:44-45).
Both Mr. Wilcox and Ms. Waldron saw Defendant walk out of the D.I. carrying a
bulging, small green duffle bag, about foot-and-half long (R. 130:45, 90). Ms. Waldron
testified that the duffle bag was extremely full (R. 130:90). Mr. Wilcox asked Ms. Waldron
to accompany him outside because he did not want to confront defendant without another
woman present (R. 130:45,90). Both Mr. Wilcox and Ms. Waldron stepped outside the thrift
store (R. 130:45,90). Following his usual practice, Mr. Wilcox was wearing a red employee
vest along with a large identifying name tag(R. 130:39,48,55, 71). Within ten or fifteen feet
of the door, Mr. Wilcox approached defendant and calmly introduced himself, saying,
"Ma'am, I need to talk to you" (R. 130:45, 91). In response, defendant turned to face Mr.
Wilcox. She looked scared; her eyes appeared "hysterical.... I mean they got huge" (R.
130:46). Mr. Wilcox testified that defendant then turned, ran to her car, threw her packages
in, and started the car up (R. 130:45-46, 75, 90-91). Ms. Waldron also confirmed that
defendant, in glancing back, knew she had been approached but did not want to really
acknowledge it (R. 130:91).
Mr. Wilcox is completely unable to run or jump because he has a prosthetic knee from
being trampled by a horse. He also has only one lung and at the time of the robbery was
tethered to an "obvious" oxygen tank through a [tracheal tube] (R. 130:46-47, 91).

5

Mr. Wilcox walked over to Defendant's car (R. 130:46-47, 71). He knocked on the
car's passenger window and again "nicely" said, "Ma'am, I need to speak to you" (R.
130:46-47, 71-72, 92). Mr. Wilcox's employee badge and red vest were "right in her
window," and defendant was looking right him (R. 130:46). Ms. Waldron, standing behind
Mr. Wilcox as he knocked on Defendant's car window, observed that Mr. Wilcox addressed
defendant in a friendly manner (R. 130:92).
Defendant reversed her car "and went screaming backwards," causing Mr. Wilcox to
move towards another car (R. 130:47-48, 93). His evasive movement left defendant with
three lanes in which to drive off (R. 130:48). As defendant's car faced him, he pointed at his
red vest. Defendant's eyes again got big, she revved the engine, and she drove straight
towards him (R. 130:48-49,93,97). Ms. Waldron testified that defendant had room to avoid
hitting Mr. Wilcox (R. 130:93). Defendant hit Mr. Wilcox with her car once and then a
second time, throwing him onto the hood and then to the pavement. Only when defendant
turned and drove away did Mr. Wilcox roll off defendant's car (R. 130:49, 76-77, 94, 9798). Ms. Waldron considered the incident intentional and not accidental (R. 130:95).
Ms. Waldron ran to record the make and license plate number of defendant's car (R.
130:51, 94). Officer Troy Arnold of the Sandy City Police Department investigated the
robbery (R. 130:109). He found that the D.I. camera surveillance system did not cover the
entire floor, including the dressing room, nor did it even show defendant (R. 130: 111, 11314). From the vehicle's description Detective Arnold identified defendant as the owner of

6

the vehicle (R. 130:110-111). Based on that information, Officer Michael Hopkins of the
Sandy City Police Department went to defendant's residence in South Jordan later that day
(R. 130:120, 122).
Once at defendant's residence, Officer Hopkins requested to look in the garage and
in the car (R. 130:123). Defendant and her husband consented (R. 130:123). Officer
Hopkins did not see the bag in either of these two locations (R. 130:124). When he asked
to search the residence, the Rasmussens declined, stating, "No, not without a warrant" (R.
130:123). Officer Hopkins did not search the house (R. 130:123). Both Officers Arnold and
Hopkins saw a large palm print on the left-hand side of the hood of Defendant's vehicle that
was smeared as if the hand had been sliding (R. 130:111, 117, 119, 121).
Five people, including Mr. Wilcox, searched the entire store for the wedding dress
immediately after the robbery and repeatedly in days afterward and failed to find it (R.
130:54, 68-69). The dress was only found by a D.I. employee five or six days later, turned
inside out and "shoved in the middle of all of our stuff (R. 130:65-66, 68, 125-26). Mr.
Wilcox had no doubt that the dress must have re-entered the store through its front doors (R.
130:68). Officer Mark Soper of the Sandy City Police Department received the dress from
the D.L after it was found (R. 130:125-26). He was informed that the dress had been found
in the bid section of the D.L under the edge of the table 'to the customer's side" (R.
130:126). Officer Soper testified that the dress would not have been difficult to see (R.
130:126-27).

7

As a result of defendant's actions, Mr. Wilcox sustained considerable injuries for
which, at the time of trial six months after the robbery, he was still receiving treatment (R.
130:49-50). Specifically, Mr. Wilcox suffered neck and head injuries that have resulted in
constant headaches (R. 130:49-50). Also, his artificial knee was chipped and the blood flow
in both his legs has been restricted, all of which may require him to ultimately use a
wheelchair (R. 130:49).
Defendant testified on her own behalf (R. 130:131-66). She claimed that she took the
dress to the cashier because it did not have a bid slip on it and she wanted to know what the
minimum bid was (R. 130:135-36). After standing in line for a few minutes, she walked off
to look at other items in the store (R. 130:139-140). At some point she looked at the tag on
the dress and, seeing it too large, left it with the other formal dresses (R. 140-41). She then
meandered through the store (130:144). She went to the dressing room to try on some pants,
but she did not like them (R. 130:144-45). Then she left the store (R. 130:145). She denied
taking the dress from the store (R. 130:164).
Defendant claims that outside the store Mr. Wilcox approached her with an angry
expression on his face, which intimidated her a little (R. 130:145-46). She claims that she
did not hear him say anything to her, nor did see him wearing a vest or name tag (R. 130:146,
166). However, when he "pounded" on the window of her car, she panicked (R. 130:147).
When she attempted to drive away, she found "that same man . . . sitting on my car," w ith
a "defiant expression," "like . . . ' What are you going to do?'" (R. 130:148,150). However,
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because she did not want to hurt him, she moved slowly forward, though fast enough that he
fell off the car (R. 130:148). Defendant did not recall ever hitting Mr. Wilcox (R. 130:150).
She claimed she was "just bewildered" and that her conduct was due to past abusive
experience (R. 130:149-50).
Defendant not only denied refusing Officer Hopkins' request to search the house, but
rather asserted that she and her husband invited the search, saying: "Go ahead, check
everything" (R. 130:152).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The Court should decline to consider defendant's insufficiency of evidence claim
because she has substantially failed to marshal all the evidence in support of the jury's
verdict. Even considering defendant's claim, the substantial, unmarshaled evidence clearly
supports defendant's robbery conviction: with the exception of a very brief period during
which defendant was in or near the dressing rooms, defendant was always observed in
possession of the stolen dress; defendant exited the dressing rooms carrying a '"bulging"
duffel bag not previously noticed by a witness who watched her; repeated searches of the
dressing rooms immediately after defendant's exit and of the entire store failed to uncover
the dress until five days afterward; defendant fled the premises in a violent manner, causing
serious injury to a clearly identifiable store employee.

9

POINT II
The Court should decline to consider defendant's claim that the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding her testimony about her extreme reactions in the parking lot because
she failed to proffer the substance of her purported testimony. Without a proffer this Court
cannot determine whether defendant is entitled to a reversal of her conviction. In any case,
any error was harmless because the extra record source relied on by defendant, besides being
an improper proffer, is insufficient to show that the outcome would have been different.
POINT III
The Court should decline to consider defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim because defendant has failed to support her claims with a record on appeal. To the
extent that defendant may have referenced the record, her claims readily fail to show her
counsel performed deficiently. Indeed, several assertions are contrary to the record.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS SUBSTANTIALLY FAILED TO
MARSHAL ALL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE JURY'S
VERDICT, THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER
DEFENDANT'S NONMERITORIOUS CHALLENGE TO THE
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for robbery,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1999). Aplt. Br. at 9-15. However, because
defendant has substantially failed to marshal all the evidence in support of the jury's verdict,
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this Court should decline to consider defendant's sufficiency claim. Even considering the
claim, the evidence was sufficient.
A claim of insufficient evidence will not be reviewed unless the appellant marshals
all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and demonstrates how the evidence, and the
reasonable inferences therefrom, is insufficient to support the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins
Exch., 817 P.2d789, 799 (Utah 1991); State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994);
State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 607-08 (Utah App. 1994) (refusing to review claim of error
where the defendant Wholly failed to marshal the evidence," "fail[ed] to show how it [was]
insufficient to support the verdict," and "fail[ed] to address key evidence") (citations
omitted). "Failure to marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his claim of
insufficiency [of evidence] considered on appeal." State v. Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1185, 1189
(citing State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990)).
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel
must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume the
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order,
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very
findings the appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence.
The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that
the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous.
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). This Court
has stated that marshaling the evidence serves the important function of "reminding litigants
and appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the fact finder at trial," and that it "aids
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the appellate courts in deliberations and the opinion-writing process. Moore, 802 P 2d at
739. As set out below, defendant substantially failed to marshal all the evidence in support
of the jury's verdict thus waiving the right to have her claim of insufficiency considered on
appeal. State v Mincy, 838 P.2d 648,652 (Utah App. 1992) (citingMoore, 802 P.2d at 73839).
A. Defendant failed to marshal the evidence.
Defendant cursorily marshals evidence showing that she was seen in possession of the
wedding dress some time before it "allegedly could not be found"; thereafter, she was seen
leaving the D.I. dressing room with a duffel bag that "appeared" to be bulging and fled the
scene despite "alleged" requests to stop, during which she hit "an individual" with her car;
after the incident she "allegedly" refused to allow police to search her home. Aplt. at 13.
In fact, the prosecution introduced substantially more evidence in support of
defendant's guilt than defendant acknowledges:
(1) defendant admitted she was familiar with the bid section of the store
and the bidding procedure, and that she knew that bid items were
not supposed to leave the bid area (R. 130:155);
(2) defendant does not deny that she removed the wedding dress from
the bid area (R. 130:135-136);
(3) when defendant overheard Ms. Waldron express her surprise about
defendant's inappropriate possession of the dress, she abandoned
her place in line and her alleged inquiry about the bid status
of the dress, and then walked toward the rear of the store
(R. 130:88,99-100);
(4) Ms. Waldron observed defendant, dress always in hand, browse
12

through the clothes racks while periodically looking up at Ms.
Waldron and her husband (R. 130: 88-89);
(5) in the company of a cashier, Ms. Waldron found defendant exiting
one of the dressing rooms, located by the store's exit, with an
"extremely full" duffle bag in her hand (R. 130:89-90, 101);
(6) prior to defendant's exit from the dressing rooms, Ms. Waldron had
not seen anything other than the wedding dress in defendant's
possession (R. 130:88-89)
(7) an immediate search of all he dressing rooms by three employees failed
to uncover the wedding dress (R. 130:43-44);2
(8) both Mr. Wilcox and Ms. Waldron saw defendant walk out of the
D.I. carrying a bulging, small green duffle bag, about a footand-halflong(R. 130:45,90);
(9) Mr. Wilcox approached defendant in a calm and friendly manner,
asking to speak with her (R. 130:45, 91);
(10) in accordance with his usual practice, Mr. Wilcox was wearing a red
employee vest along with a large identifying name tag (R. 130:39,
48,55,71);
(11) Mr. Wilcox is disabled, to wit: he has a prosthetic knee, which
prevents him from running and he has one lung, which necessitates

2

Defendant excuses herself from marshaling the results of the fruitless dressing
room search on the mistaken belief that the evidence was excluded as inadmissible
hearsay and for lack of foundation. Aplt. Br. at 14. Defense counsel successfully
objected on both grounds to the prosecutor's initial attempts to introduce employees'
reports to Mr. Wilcox about the results of their search of the dressing rooms (R. 130:4344). However, the prosecutor then laid a satisfactory foundation for the employees'
reports, after which the evidence was admitted (R. 130:43). Also, defense counsel failed
to move to strike the employees' statements to Mr. Wilcox that "nothing was in there,"
testimony in response to a proper question (R. 130:44). Additionally, the prosecutor
achieved her objective by eliciting from Mr. Wilcox that employees returned from the
search "[without] anything in their hands" (R. 130:44).
13

his wearing a plainly visible oxygen tank (R. 130:46-47, 91);
(12) both Mr. Wilcox and Ms. Waldron testified that defendant, from
her reactions, was aware that Mr. Wilcox had tried to accost her
(R. 130:46,91);
(13) in response to Mr. Wilcox's attempts to accost her, defendant turned
and fled to her car (R. 130:45, 90-91);
(14) Mr. Waldron confirmed that when Mr. Wilcox reached defendant's car,
he again attempted to address defendant in a friendly manner by
tapping on the car window (R. 130:46-47, 71-72, 92);
(15) in response, defendant started her car and put it in reverse, causing
it to go "screaming backwards," knocking Mr. Wilcox toward
another car (R. 130:47-48); then, with her car pointing directly at
Mr. Wilcox, defendant revved her engine and drove right at him
(R. 130:48-49, 93, 97);
(16) defendant hit Mr. Wilcox with her car once and then a second time,
throwing him onto the hood and then to the pavement car, causing
him serious bodily (R. 130:49-50, 76-77, 94, 97-98);
(17) Ms. Waldron testified that defendant had room to avoid hitting Mr.
Wilcox and considered the incident intentional and not accidental
(R. 130:93, 95);
(18) five employees, including Mr. Wilcox, again searched the D.I. store for
the wedding dress on January 15, immediately after the incident and
repeatedly in days afterward, but failed to find it (R. 130:54, 68-69);
(19) the missing dress reappeared in the bid area five days after the
robbery in a place in which it would not have been difficult to see
(R. 130:125-27);
(20) defendant seriously undermined her own credibility by giving testimony,
which in light of the testimony of other witnesses and the circumstances,
was highly implausible and, by inference, incriminating:
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- in spite of Mr. Wilcox's red employee's vest and name tag,
defendant denied that Mr. Wilcox was unidentifiable to
her as a D.I. employee (R. 130:146, 166);
- in spite of Ms. Waldron's and Mr. Wilcox's testimony to
the contrary, defendant insisted that Mr. Wilcox
approached her angrily (R. 130:145-46);
- in spite of Mr. Wilcox's palpable injuries, defendant claimed she
drove her car slowly forward and that she did not recall
ever hitting Mr. Wilcox with her car (R. 130:148, 150);
- in spite of Mr. Wilcox's obvious physical limitations and
burdens from medical appliances, defendant claimed that
as she tried to drive away she found him sitting on the
hood of her car with his arms crossed, wearing a
defiant expression (R. 130:148, 150);
- in spite Officer Hopkins' testimony that the Rasmussens
refused consent to search their house without a warrant
and that consequently the police did not search the house,
defendant asserted that she and her husband very readily
invited a search (R. 130:123, 152).
As discussed briefly in the following section, the foregoing unmarshaled evidence
forms the basis for reasonable inferences of defendant's guilt, inferences that could not be
derived or necessarily supported from defendant's cursory and incomplete rendition of the
facts. Because defendant so seriously fails to marshal this evidence on which the jury's
verdict was evidently based, this Court should decline to consider defendant's challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence. In any case, defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence is without merit.
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B. The evidence of defendant's guilt is sufficient3
In order to successfully challenge a jury's verdict the reviewing court must find that
the evidence and inferences based on that evidence are so "inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,.
444 (Utah 1983). In undertaking such review, the appellate court will "view the evidence,
along with the reasonable inferences from it, in the light most favorable to the verdict/'
Moore, 802 P.2d at 738 (citation omitted). "[S]o long as some evidence and reasonable
inferences support the jury's findings, [the reviewing court] will not disturb them." Id.
(citing State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)).
To convict the defendant of second degree robbery the State was required to show
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly used force or fear of immediate force
against Mr. Wilcox in the course of committing or attempting to commit a theft.4 The
3

In the proceedings below, defendant moved for a directed verdict and to arrest
judgment (R. 93-102, 130:131). The trial court denied both motions (R. 126-27,
130:181). However, defendant's notice of appeal, filed prior to the court's denial of her
motion to arrest judgment (R. 107-08), and her entire discussion on appeal, do not
challenge the trial court's rulings on her motions. Rather, defendant appears only to
generally challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict.
Accordingly, the State's discussion is tailored to this general challenge.
4

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 provides in pertinent part:

(1) A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal
property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence,
against his will, by means of force or fear; or
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evidence marshaled in the preceding section shows that the prosecution met its burden at
trial, and, accordingly, that defendant has failed to meet her burden on appeal.
Defendant does not dispute that the evidence is sufficient to show that she "knowingly
used force or fear of immediate force against Mr. Wilcox." Rather, the central thrust of
defendant's argument is that proof of the theft, supported only by circumstantial evidence,
is insufficient. Aplt. Br. at 10-15. In essence, defendant argues that without direct evidence
that defendant had the dress in her possession when she left the D.I. store the prosecution
failed to prove an element of the offense. Defendant misconstrues the requirements of the
law.
"It is well-settled in this state that 'a conviction can be based on sufficient
circumstantial evidence.'" State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting
State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,344 (Utah 1997)). "In such a case, [the reviewing court] must
determine '(1) whether there is any evidence that supports each and every element of the
crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence have a
basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each legal element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Brown, 948 P.2d at 344 (quoting State v. Workman,

(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force
against another in the course of committing a theft.
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it occurs in
an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate flight after
the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree
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852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993)).
The circumstantial evidence marshaled above readily support reasonable, logical
inferences that defendant committed a theft, i.e., that defendant left the store with the dress.
Defendant was seen in possession of only the wedding dress moments before its
disappearance (R. 130:87-90, 100, 136). Moments later she was seen walking from the
dressing rooms to the store's exit with nothing but a bulging duffle bag (R. 130:42, 45, 8990, 101). A thorough search of the dressing rooms immediately after defendant's egress
failed to locate the dress (R. 130:43-44). Although, defendant claimed she left the dress on
a clothes rack in the store, an immediate search and later, repeated searches of the entire store
after the robbery failed to turn up the missing dress (R. 130: 54, 68-69, 113-114). The
missing dress was discovered five days later in a place in which it would not have been
difficult to see, after defendant had refused consent to search her house (R. 130:123,125-27).
From the foregoing facts the jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant took
the dress into a dressing room, put it into a previously concealed bag, and then left the store
with it. The logic of the inference is supported by the dress's disappearance immediately
after defendant's admitted possession of it and defendant's carrying a previously unnoticed
bulging duffel bag out of the store immediately after the dress was last seen. The failure of
D.I.'s staff to locate the dress after repeated searches lends further strength to the inference
that from the time Ms. Waldron saw defendant with the dress until it was discovered five
days later, only defendant was in possession of it. Indeed, the odd circumstances of the
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dress's ultimate discovery support the inference that the dress was secreted back into the D.I.
store by someone who wished to avoid detection.
Defendant's conduct also supports the inference that defendant committed a theft.
"While a defendant's flight from a crime scene, standing alone, 'does not support an
inference of intentional conduct,' . . . the circumstances of a defendant's flight, in addition
to other circumstantial evidence, may be adequate to support such an inference. State v.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^23, 10 P.3d 346 (citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 789, 790 (Utah
1991)). '"Flight by itself is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the defendant, but is merely
a circumstance to be considered with other factors as tending to show a consciousness of
guilt and therefore guilt itself.'" Id. at ^[23 n.6 (quoting Charles E. Torcia ed., 13th ed.
1972)) (emphasis added).
The evidence marshaled above shows that defendant disregarded reasonable attempts
by a readily identifiable D.I. employee to accost her and inquire about her activities (R.
130:39,45, 48, 55, 71, 91). In response, defendant fled to her car, again disregarded
reasonable attempts to make contact with her, and intentionally drove directly into her victim
in an effort to escape (R. 130:45-50,71-72,76-77,90-91,93-95,97-98). From this evidence
the jury could reasonably have inferred that defendant's acts betrayed a guilty mind in having
stolen the dress.
Finally, the evidence marshaled above strongly suggests that defendant lied on the
stand. In the face of credible evidence to the contrary, defendant claimed that she could not
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recognize Mr. Wilcox as a D.I. employee, that he approached her angrily, that she did not
recall driving into Mr. Wilcox with her car, that she suddenly found her obviously medically
compromised pursuer perched on the hood of her car with a defiant expression, and that she
welcomed a police search of her house (R. 130:123, 145-46, 148, 150, 152, 166). From this
evidence the jury would likely have doubted defendant's credibility, from which it further
inferred defendant's guilt.
In sum, the evidence which defendant failed to marshal reasonably and logically
supports the inference that defendant stole the dress and committed robbery.
POINT II
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROFFER HER PURPORTED
TESTIMONY SHE HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE HER CLAIM THAT
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN LIMITING HER
TESTIMONY; IN ANY CASE, ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS
Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow her to testify
about a specific event which, purportedly, would have explained her behavior outside the D.I.
store. Aplt. Br. at 16-18. However, because defense counsel failed to proffer the substance
of defendant's purported testimony, this Court lacks a record on which to assess defendant's
claim. Even if the Court were to construe the substance of defendant's purported testimony
and find the trial court abused its discretion in excluding it, the error would be harmless
because exclusion of the evidence would not have affected the outcome of the case.
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A. Defendant failed to preserve her claim for appeal
bv failing to proffer her purported testimony.
'" [The reviewing court] will not set aside a verdict because of the erroneous exclusion
of evidence unless a proffer of evidence appears of record, and [the court] believe[s] that the
excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a
different verdict.'" State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 445 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v.
RammeU 721 P.2d 498,499-500 (Utah 1986)). InArguelles, the record was silent about what
evidence the defendant's counsel intended to adduce in examining a witness. Id. at 445.
Therefore, because the court had no means of assessing whether that evidence could have led
to an acquittal, it declined to address the merits of defendant's claim. Id. See also Utah R.
Evid. 103 (a)(2) ("Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which . . . excludes evidence
unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and . . . the substance of the evidence was
made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions
were asked.").
This Court should decline to consider the merits of defendant's claim for the same
reasons applicable mArguelles. On direct examination, defense counsel asked defendant to
explain her response to Mr. Wilcox's approach in the parking lot (R. 130:149). Defendant
answered that, "Pm very anxious and fearful... because I've had a history of abusive kinds
of situations happening to me" (R. 130:149). When defense counsel inquired further about
what made defendant "so intimidated in life," the prosecution objected on the ground that
defendant's prior experiences were irrelevant and that defendant sought to introduce them
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merely to gain sympathy (R. 130:149). The trial court sustained the objection, stating that
defendant had already testified to her heightened sensitivities and that further delving into
her personal affairs on any specific occasion was unnecessary (R. 130:149).
Defendant's claim fails because, at the very least, he failed to make a proffer of
defendant's purported testimony at the time the trial court denied further examination.
Defendant cites State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991), in support of her claim
that evidence of prior events which tends to disprove criminal intent is admissible. Aplt. Br.
at 16-17. See id. at 781 (citing with approval State v. Smith, 728 P.2d 1014 (Utah 1986) and
Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979)). However, in Harrison,
Smith, and Zions, the party challenging the trial court's denial of further examination made
a substantial proffer of the prospective evidence. See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 781 (the
defendant's testimony that he was threatened and his car fire-bombed by "Crips" two months
before fatal shooting was relevant to show why the defendant, charged with murder, regularly
carried a gun); Smith, 728 P.2d at 1015 (finding admissible testimony of the defendant,
previously incarcerated, that he would never have knowingly done an illegal act in such an
open manner for fear of returning to prison where his poor health due to emphysema and
tuberculosis would deteriorate further); cf. Zions, 605 P.2d at 322-23 (upholding trial court's
very limited admission of evidence following proffer of explicit information of defendant's
hysterical conduct in prior shoplifting incident four years earlier).
Defendant's attempted proffer on appeal is unavailing. She cites not to any proffer
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made when trial court excluded her testimony, but rather to a single line from her version of
the offense in the presentence report: "[Defendant] advised she was assaulted by a man
previously, which caused her to feel her safety was in jeopardy" (Presentence report, R. 128
at p. 3). That statement cannot stand as a proffer not only because there is no certainty that
it was the testimony defendant would have offered at trial, but also because a proffer must
be timely in order for the trial court to intelligently rule on its admissibility. Cf. State v.
Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996) ("A timely objection provides the trial court with
'an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it.'") (citation omitted).
Further, exclusion of such a slender statement, which may have been remote in time, could
hardly have resulted in a different outcome. In short, defendant has failed to make the
minimal showing under the Arguelles standard that the trial court abused its discretion in
excluding her purported testimony.
POINT HI
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL FAILS BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO
DEVELOP ANY RELEVANT RECORD FOR APPEAL OR IDENTIFY
ANY DEFICIENCIES IN HER TRIAL COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE
Defendant claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of
numerous alleged deficiencies in her trial counsel's performance. Aplt. Br. at 19-28.
However, defendant's claim fails because she has failed either to support the alleged
deficiencies with an adequate record or to show that her counsel was deficient.
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A. Defendant must support her ineffective assistance claim with a record.
"[An appellate court] review[s] a challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel by first
determining whether counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, determining whether
the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. State v. Severance, 828 P.2d 1066, 1070
(Utah App. 1992) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668,687,104 S. Ct. 2052,2064
(1984)).
"Proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be
demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). Further, an
appellate court will "assume the regularity of the proceedings below when appellant fails to
provide an adequate record on appeal." State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App.
1995), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996) (citing Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150
(Utah 1989)). In State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
When a defendant predicates error to [an appellate court], he has the duty and
responsibility of supporting such allegation by an adequate record. Absent that
record, defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral allegation which
the review court has no power to determine. This Court simply cannot rule on
a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by
the record.
Id. at 293 (citations omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court has recently reasserted that, since the adoption of rule 23B,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellate court will simply assume that trial counsel
performed effectively if a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is unsupported by an
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adequate record: "If a defendant is aware of any 'nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully
appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that counsel
was ineffective/ Utah R. App. P. 23B, defendant bears the primary obligation and burden
of moving for a temporary remand." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^16, 12 P.3d 92
(recognizing that "[rule 23B] was specifically designed to address the inadequate record
dilemma").5

"Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or

deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel
performed effectively." Id. at 1J17 (noting that "[t]his presumption is consistent with the
fundamental policies dictated by Strickland, see 466 U.S. at 689, [that] 'courts must indulge
a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance/ and with the general rule that record inadequacies result in an
assumption of regularity on appeal") (citing State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Utah
1997)).

5

Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides in pertinent part:

(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case may
move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of
fact, necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion shall be available only upon a
nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on
appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was
ineffective.
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B. Because defendant has failed to develop an adequate record
to support her claim that her trial counsel performed deficiently,
the Court should presume that counsel's conduct was within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
Defendant makes the following claims of ineffective assistance which are
inadequately supported by a record on appeal:
Failure to call psychiatrist
Defendant claims her counsel failed to call her psychiatrist who allegedly would have
testified about defendant's being the target of past abuse and her panic reactions when
confronted by men she perceives to be aggressive. Aplt. Br. at 20. The State acknowledges
that accompanying the presentence report is a four-page letter of a Dr. Lane Smith,
defendant's psychiatrist, that supports defendant's assertions about her psychiatric condition
(Letter of Dr. Lane Smith accompanying presentence report, R. 128). However, the letter is
unsworn, was never authenticated, never admitted, and was never the basis of any sworn
testimony. Thus, it would be insufficient to support a motion for a remand for a hearing
under rule 23 B and should not be considered part of the record for evidentiary purposes. See
Utah R. App. P. 23B(b) ("The motion shall include or be accompanied by affidavits alleging
facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal that show the claimed deficient performance
of the attorney.") (emphasis added).
Even if the Court considered Dr. Smith's letter a sufficient record to support an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defense counsel would have been acting well within
the range of reasonable professional competence in not calling Dr. Smith to testify. If
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defendant had called Dr. Smith to testify as an expert on her psychiatric condition, defendant
would had been required to give notice and disclose the substance of his testimony. See Utah
Code Ann. ^ 77-17-13(1) & (2) (1999). Assuming Dr. Smith's letter constituted sufficient
disclosure, the prosecution would have learned, among other compromising information, that
Dr. Smith repeatedly referenced defendant as a "kleptomaniac" who had committed minor
thefts on several occasions, subsequently returning the stolen goods out of guilt (Letter of Dr.
Lane Smith, pp. 1-3). Defense counsel quite reasonably might have chosen not to call Dr.
Smith, considering the negative effect that such disclosures might have had on the jury.
Failure to investigate whether D.I. store had been
searched and to introduce evidence to the contrary
Defendant claims her counsel failed to investigate whether the D.I. store had been
searched by employees subsequent to the disappearance of the dress and failed to introduce
evidence that it had not been so searched. Aplt. Br. at 22-23. This allegation is unsupported
by any record evidence.
Failure to put on evidence that items in the D.I. store are frequently misplaced
Defendant claims her counsel "failed to investigate and put on a witness that allegedly
could have established that the clothing sections in the D. I. are frequently unorganized and
that items are routinely misplaced. Aplt. Br. at 23. This allegation is unsupported by any
record evidence.
Failure to point out discrepancies in prosecution witnesses9 testimony
Defendant claims her counsel "failed to point out that the stories told by the
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prosecution witnesses varied widely."

Aplt. Br. at 23.

Defendant recites alleged

discrepancies between witnesses' trial testimony and their statements to the police. In
support, defendant references a police report, which she has also attached to her brief. Aplt.
Br. at 23 n.8. However, the police report was never an exhibit in any proceeding and was
never made part of the record on appeal. Contemporaneous with the filing of this brief, the
State has moved this Court to strike the police report from the addendum to defendant's
opening brief.
Failure to introduce the bag into evidence
Defendant claims her counsel failed to introduce her bag into evidence and thereby
failed to show that the dress would not fit into it. Aplt. Br. at 23-24. This allegation is
unsupported by any record evidence.
Failure to show that police officer's testimony was untrue
Defendant claims her counsel failed to demonstrate that Officer Hopkins' testimony,
that defendant refused consent to search her house, was untrue. Aplt. Br. at 24. In support,
defendant relies on the "Law Enforcement Statement" in the presentence report, the police
report referenced above, and "other witnesses, including [defendant's] husband, who could
have been called to substantiate her testimony that there was no refusal to permit a search of
the home." Aplt. Br. at 24. In fact, the Law Enforcement Statement directly contradicts
defendant's assertion, stating: "[Detective Soper] advised the defendant was untruthful
during the trial in claiming she told officers they could search her entire house, when in fact
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she demanded a search warrant if they wanted to search anywhere other than the garage"
(Presentence report, R. 128, p. 5). Further, the police report or the testimony of "other
witnesses" was never made part of the record.
Failure to point out nonexistence of video surveillance
Defendant claims that defense counsel, "[knowing] that no videotape of store
surveillance existed... failed to point out this inaccuracy in policy [sic] testimony. Aplt. Br.
at 25 (citing R 130:112). The allegation that defense counsel knew that no video surveillance
tape existed is unsupported by any record evidence. In fact, Detective Arnold testified that
he viewed the surveillance videotape and that it revealed nothing (R. 130:112-14).
In sum, because defendant has failed to support any of the foregoing allegations of
ineffective assistance with record evidence, the Court should presume that defendant's trial
counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
C

Defendant's other allegations of ineffective assistance
are uniformly without merit and even contrary to the record.

""The failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if
raised does not constitute ineffective assistance."'" State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, P34, 989
P.2d 52 (quoting Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v.
Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1982))).
Failure to challenge testimony that defendant hit victim
Defendant claims her counsel "inexcusably undermined [defendant's] credibility" by
not challenging prosecution witnesses who testified that defendant hit Mr. Wilcox with her
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car. Instead, defendant argues that defense counsel should have supported defendant's
testimony that she did not believe she hit Mr. Wilcox. Aplt. Br. at 25.
This claim is unsound. Ms. Waldron testified that although defendant had substantial
room to avoid hitting Mr. Wilcox, she drove directly into him, paused and then struck him
a second time, throwing him onto the hood of her car; she considered defendant's acts to be
intentional (R. 130:93-95, 97-99). As a result of defendant's actions, Mr. Wilcox suffered
substantial, if not serious bodily injury, evidence not credibly challenged either in the trial
court or on appeal (R. 130:49-50). Mr. Wilcox is limited by a prosthetic knee and his tether
to oxygen (R. 130:46-47, 91). Defendant fails to show that the evidence concerning Mr.
Wilcox's physical condition before and after the robbery is creditably challengeable. In light
of this substantial evidence, defendant's assertions at trial, that she did not believe she had
hit Mr. Wilcox with her car and that she simply discovered him sitting on the hood of her car
with a "defiant expression," might reasonably have struck defense counsel as testimony not
to be highlighted at the risk of completely losing credibility with the jury (R. 130:148, 150).
See State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 160 (Utah 1989) ("Whenever there is a legitimate
exercise of professional judgment in the choice of trial strategy, the fact that it did not
produce the expected result does not constitute ineffectiveness of counsel.").
Failure to point out that defendant was not
observed taking the dress into the dressing room
Defendant claims that defense counsel failed to point out to the jury that "no witness
ever saw [her] take the dress into the dressing room." Aplt. Br. at 25 (emphasis in
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defendant's brief). This claim is directly controverted by the record. In fact, defense counsel
elicited from Ms. Waldron on cross-examination that she did not see defendant take the dress
into the dressing room (R. 130:100-01). Further, defense counsel pointed out to the jury in
closing this weakness in the State's theory (R. 131:192).
Failure to object to the admission of victim Js injuries
Defendant claims her counsel failed to object to testimony concerning Mr. Wilcox's
injuries as "irrelevant, prejudicial, and hearsay." She further claims that counsel could have
shown the injuries were "grossly overstated," based on "the police report." Aplt. Br. at 25.
This claim is without legal merit and unsupported by the record on appeal. The description
of the injuries were plainly not hearsay since Mr. Wilcox was testifying about his own
experience of his physical condition; they were plainly not prejudicial, since he merely
described his injuries in words, without even displaying them to the jury; they were plainly
relevant to prove an element of the offense, that defendant acted with "force or fear of
immediate force against another in the course of committing a theft" (R. 130:49-50). Again,
the police report relied on by defendant has never been made part of the record on appeal.
Failure to raise self-defense
Defendant claims her trial counsel should have asked for an instruction on selfdefense in order to explain to the jury that "she was acting with the intent to escape bodily
injury or death." Aplt. Br. at 21-22. This claim is utterly without legal foundation.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1999) (emphasis added), provides in pertinent part:
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(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and
to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend
himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force.
However, that person is justified in using force intended or likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury only if he or she reasonably believes that force
is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to herself... as a result
of the other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the commission
of a forcible felony.
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified
in Subsection (1) if he or she:
(b) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the
commission or attempted commission of a felony; or
(c) (i) was the aggressor . . . .
Based on the requirements of section 76-2-402, defendant was not entitled to a selfdefense instruction. As recited repeatedly throughout this brief, Mr. Wilcox posed no threat
at all, let alone a threat to defendant of death or serious bodily injury. Thus, defendant's
running her victim down could not have been based on a "reasonable belief," regardless of
her own peculiar perceptions. Secondly, there was sufficient evidence that defendant was
committing a felony when she used unjustifiable force. Third, the evidence shows that
defendant was the aggressor in the incident. Therefore, since defendant was not entitled to
a self-defense instruction, defense counsel did not act deficiently in not requesting one.
In sum, defendant has failed to show that her trial counsel's performance was deficient
in any respect claimed on appeal. Because defendant "cannot show the [she] satisfied the
first part of the Strickland test, [the reviewing court] need not consider the second. See State
v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 315 (Utah 1998).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's
conviction be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not request
that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. This request is bolstered by
defendant's uniform failure to fulfill the basic requirements of marshaling the evidence and
presenting an adequate record for appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /?

day of March, 2001.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

76-2-402. Force in defense of person — Forcible felony
defined.
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when
and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to
defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful
force. However, that person is justified in using force intended or likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury only if he or she reasonably believes that force is
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third person
as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the
commission of a forcible felony.
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified
in Subsection (1) if he or she:
(a) initially provokes the use of force against himself with the intent to
use force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant;
(b) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission
or attempted commission of a felony; or
(c) (i) was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement,
unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person his intent to do so and, notwithstanding, the
other person continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful
force; and
(ii) for purposes of Subsection (i) the following do not, by themselves, constitute "combat by agreement":
(A) voluntarily entering into or remaining in an ongoing relationship; or
(B) entering or remaining in a place where one has a legal
right to be.
(3) A person does not have a duty to retreat from the force or threatened
force described in Subsection (1) in a place where that person has lawfully
entered or remained, except as provided in Subsection (2)(c).
(4) For purposes of this section, a forcible felony includes aggravated
assault, mayhem, aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and
aggravated kidnapping, rape, forcible sodomy, rape of a child, object rape,
object rape of a child, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a
child, and aggravated sexual assault as defined in Title 76, Chapter 5, and
arson, robbery, and burglary as defined in Title 76, Chapter 6. Any other felony
offense which involves the use of force or violence against a person so as to
create a substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury also constitutes a
forcible felony. Burglary of a vehicle, defined in Section 76-6-204, does not
constitute a forcible felony except when the vehicle is occupied at the time
unlawful entry is made or attempted.
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the
trier of fact may consider, but is not limited to, amy of the following factors:
(a) the nature of the danger,
(b) the immediacy of the danger;
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or
serious bodily injury;
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; and
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship.

76-6-301.

Robbery.

(1) A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear; or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against another in the course of committing a theft.
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate
flight after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
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77-17-13* Expert testimony generally — Notice requirements.
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify
in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing
held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon
as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the
hearing.
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's
curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report.
(2) (a) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed
testimony.
(b) If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not
adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed
testimony including any opinion and the bases and reasons of that
opinion, the party intending to call the expert shall provide to the opposing
party a written explanation of the expert's anticipated testimony sufficient
to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the
testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by the expert when
available.
(3) (a) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report, the party
receiving notice shall provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom
the party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony; including the
name and address of any expert witness and the expert's curriculum vitae.
If available, a report of any rebuttal expert shall be provided to the other
party.
(b) If the rebuttal expert has not prepared a report or the report does
not adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed
testimony, or in the event the rebuttal witness is not an expert, the party
intending to call the rebuttal witness shall provide a written explanation
of the witness's anticipated rebuttal testimony sufficient to give the
opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony, followed
by a copy of any report prepared by any rebuttal expert when available.
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of
this section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the
trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony.
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the
result of bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall
impose appropriate sanctions.
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary
hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of
the expert's proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to by
the expert at the preliminary hearing.
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary
hearing shall provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's
curriculum vitae as soon as practicable prior to trial or any hearing at
which the expert may be called as an expert witness.
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Rule 23B, Motion to remand for findings necessary to
determination of ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case may
move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact,
necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The motion shall be available only upon a nonspeculative
allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true,
could support a determination that counsel was ineffective.
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief. Upon a
showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the filing
of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to be filed
after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from
remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim
has been raised and the motion would have been available to a party.
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be
accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on
appeal that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The
affidavits shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the
appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. The motion shall
also be accompanied by a proposed order or remand that identifies the
ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such
claim to be addressed on remand.
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the^motion is filed. The
response shall include a proposed order of remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such claim to
be addressed by the trial court in the event remand is granted, unless the
responding party accepts that proposed by the moving party. Any reply shall be
filed within 10 days after the response is filed.
(c) Order of the court. If the requirements of parts (a) and (b) of this rule
have been met, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to
the trial court for the purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The order of remand shall identify the
ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual issues relevant to each such
claim to be addressed by the trial court. The order shall also direct the trial
court to complete the proceedings on remand within 90 days of issuance of the
order of remand, absent a finding by the trial court of good cause for a delay of
reasonable length.
If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of record on
the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the court shall direct that
counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or
retained.
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be
vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other procedural
steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand,
unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties
or upon the court's motion.
(e) Proceedings before the trial court. Upon remand the trial court shall
promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the
findings of fact necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Any claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand
shall not be considered by the trial court on remand, unless the trial court
determines that the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require consideration of issues not specifically identified in the order of remand. Evidentiary
hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable after
remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the fact.
The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court
shall enter written findings of fact concerning the claimed deficient performance by counsel and the claimed prejudice suffered by appellant as a result,
in accordance with the order of remand. Proceedings on remand shall be
completed within 90 days of entry of the order of remand, unless the trial court
finds good cause for a delay of reasonable length.

<f> Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court
reporter shall immediately prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings
as required by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the
trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial
court shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings
upon preparation of the supplemental record. If the record of the original
proceedings before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate
court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental
proceedings upon the preparation of the entire record.
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the trial
court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule for
briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been made
during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals.
The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the
same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals.
(Added effective October 1^ 1992; amended effective April 1, 1998.)
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Rule 103. Rulings on evidence.
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling*
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection
or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection,
if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer ofproof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance
of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the
context within which questions were asked.
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making
of an offer in question and answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or oifers of proof
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of
the court.

